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CONFLICT PREEMPTION: A REMEDY FOR THE DISPARATE
IMPACT OF CRIME-FREE NUISANCE ORDINANCES
Meredith Joseph*

ABSTRACT
Thousands of municipalities across the country have adopted crime-free
nuisance ordinances—laws that sanction landlords for their tenants’ behaviors,
coercing them to evict tenants for actions as innocuous as calling 9-1-1 in an
emergency. These facially neutral ordinances give wide discretion to municipal
officials, leading to discriminatory enforcement of evictions. As a result, these
ordinances have a devastating impact on victims of domestic violence and are
used as a tool to inhibit integration in majority-white municipalities. Many
plaintiffs have brought lawsuits alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution and
the Fair Housing Act. However, bringing lawsuits under various antidiscrimination protections presents many challenges. Less than five percent of all
discrimination plaintiffs will achieve relief, and eighty-six percent of
1
discrimination claims end in dismissals. Professor Katie Eyer, an antidiscrimination legal scholar, has advocated for increasing the use of “extradiscrimination remedies,” litigation-based approaches that are not rooted in anti2
discrimination laws. This Note explores one potential extra-discrimination
remedy that could be used to challenge crime-free nuisance ordinances: conflict
preemption. Crime-free nuisance ordinances that are not tailored to state landlordtenant laws’ grounds for eviction may be in conflict with, and preempted by, state
law. This Note also recommends that fair housing advocates collaborate with
landlord associations when challenging crime-free nuisance ordinances. Although
the interests of landlords and tenants often conflict, both groups are harmed by
municipalities that enact crime-free nuisance ordinances.
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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of September 24, 2011, Rosetta Watson was
asleep in her bed when her former boyfriend, Robert Hennings,
3
knocked on her door. She awoke and told him that he was not
4
welcome inside. Mr. Hennings then broke down Ms. Watson’s
5
door, entered her bedroom, and punched her in the face. Ms.

3. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 42, 45, Watson v. City of Maplewood, No 4:17-cv-1268
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2017) [hereinafter First Amended Watson Complaint].
4. Id. ¶ 45.
5. Id.
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Watson fled her apartment and called the police. The police arrested Mr. Hennings for assault, but he was released shortly after
7
and the abuse continued. Ms. Watson was a victim of repeated
domestic violence; between September 2011 and February 2012,
8
she called the police for help four times. Unbeknownst to her, the
9
municipality where she lived was keeping a tally of these calls.
Ms. Watson lived in Maplewood, a small municipality in St. Louis
County. A Maplewood ordinance authorizes the removal of resi10
dents from their homes if they are deemed a “nuisance.” When
Ms. Watson lived in Maplewood, the definition of nuisance encompassed a wide range of activities, including more than two instances in six months of domestic violence resulting in police
11
calls. Though the Maplewood city officials were aware that Ms.
Watson was a victim of domestic violence, they deemed her a nuisance, revoked her residency permit, and forced her out of her
12
home. Ms. Watson is not the only domestic violence survivor to be
13
re-victimized by her city’s nuisance ordinance. Around 2,000 municipalities across the country have adopted crime-free nuisance
14
ordinances similar to Maplewood’s.
Crime-free nuisance ordinances give municipalities the power to
interfere with a private lease contract and force landlords to evict
certain tenants at the municipalities’ discretion. Like Maplewood,
municipalities often justify their crime-free nuisance ordinances as
necessary to prevent properties from deteriorating and to provide
15
a safe and peaceful community. However, these facially neutral

6. Id. ¶ 46.
7. Id. ¶¶ 46–58.
8. We Live Here: Nuisance, or Nonsense? (Part 1), ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO, at 11:11 (Apr. 26,
2018), https://www.welivehere.show/nuisance-or-nonsense-pt-1 [https://perma.cc/2WCMXP7G].
9. Id. at 11:26.
10. Christine Hauser, Woman Abused by Boyfriend Sues City for Evicting Her as Nuisance,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/us/aclu-domesticviolence-st-louis.html [https://perma.cc/DE3L-U24M].
11. Alisha Jarwala & Sejal Singh, When Disability Is a “Nuisance”: How Chronic Nuisance
Ordinance Push Residents with Disabilities Out of Their Homes, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 875,
879–80 (2019).
12. First Amended Watson Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 64–75. Maplewood requires residents to obtain “occupancy” or “residency” permits in order to live in the city. See Applications and Permits, MAPLEWOOD MO., https://www.cityofmaplewood.com/59/Forms-andDocuments [https://perma.cc/9CFW-CLBL]. Maplewood’s municipal code allows the city
to revoke individuals’ occupancy permits if they are deemed a nuisance. MAPLEWOOD, MO.,
MUN. CODE §§ 34-240(18); 34-242(2)(e), (h) (2020).
13. See discussion infra Section I.B.
14. Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 878.
15. Jenny Simeone-Casas, From Complaint to Eviction, Here’s How the Maplewood Nuisance
Ordinance Works, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (June 15, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://news.
stlpublicradio.org/post/complaint-eviction-heres-how-maplewood-nuisance-ordinance-works
#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5AUX-EBYC].
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ordinances create a powerful mechanism for controlling the municipality’s demographics. While much of the litigation and media
advocacy efforts to combat crime-free nuisance ordinances focus
on their disparate impact on domestic violence victims, reform efforts have paid less attention to the potential impact on Black families with children and the use of these ordinances as a tool to prevent integration in majority-white municipalities. In St. Louis
County, the problems with crime-free nuisance ordinances do not
end with Maplewood and Ms. Watson. A recent study found that
sixty-nine of the eighty-eight St. Louis County municipalities have
16
crime-free nuisance ordinances in effect. Some jurisdictions in St.
Louis County specifically target renters by excluding owner17
occupied homes from the ordinances. Since only twenty-seven
percent of white families in St. Louis rent their homes, compared
to almost sixty percent of Black families, there is great potential for
18
a racially disparate impact. “[R]acial disparities in the criminal
justice system,” combined with crime-free nuisance ordinances,
have had the “effect of promoting segregation” and “creating hous19
ing instability for vulnerable populations.”
Part I of this Note discusses the history and discriminatory nature of crime-free nuisance ordinances, highlighting two significant problems: (1) disproportionate eviction of domestic violence
survivors, and (2) preventing integration in majority-white municipalities. Part II discusses litigation strategies using antidiscrimination laws to fight crime-free nuisance ordinances and
the limitations of these strategies. Part III proposes an extradiscrimination litigation strategy, exploring the possibility of challenging these ordinances under conflict preemption doctrine.

16. Blythe Bernhard, Letters Sent to Six St. Louis County Municipalities Over ‘Problematic’
Nuisance Ordinances, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com
/news/local/metro/letters-sent-to-six-st-louis-county-municipalities-over-problematic
/article_1bf750a7-89d2-567e-9663-10e5c292b8ea.html [https://perma.cc/S4MX-2U8G]. St.
Louis has eighty-eight municipalities. St. Louis County Municipalities and Better Together: 4
Things to Know, ST. LOUIS MAG. (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.stlmag.com/news/politics/stlouis-county-municipalities-better-together/ [https://perma.cc/NWC4-TMTH].
17. Kalila J. Jackson, Dismantling the Divide: Crime Free Nuisance Ordinances Are a Public
Menace, ST. LOUIS AM. (July 26, 2018), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists
/guest_columnists/dismantling-the-divide-crime-free-nuisance-ordinances-are-apublic/article_0e8eef4c-8a8f-11e8-92c8-2f9aa8002b90.html.
18. Id.
19. Id.

SPRING 2021]

Conflict Preemption

805

I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances
Thousands of municipalities across the country have adopted
20
crime-free nuisance ordinances. Crime-free nuisance ordinances
are laws that sanction landlords for their tenants’ behaviors and of21
ten coerce landlords to “abate” the nuisance by evicting tenants.
These ordinances usually identify certain conditions or conduct
22
that deem a property a “nuisance.” “Nuisance” behavior is often
23
vaguely defined and can range from “disruptive conduct” and
24
“lewd and lascivious behavior” to violent crime and drug-related
felonies. 25 Crime-free nuisance ordinances can be triggered even
26
without a conviction. In many municipalities, a property with an
27
“excessive” number of 9-1-1 calls will also be deemed a nuisance.
Additionally, crime-free nuisance ordinances typically employ a vicarious liability scheme, meaning that the behavior of any member
of the household, their guests, or another person under the resi28
dent’s control can trigger the ordinance. If landlords fail to
“abate” the nuisance, they face sanctions including fines, revoca29
tion of their renter’s license, or even imprisonment.
Crime-free nuisance ordinances are a type of third-party com30
munity policing. Third-party policing privatizes police responsibilities by placing the onus on landlords to deal with tenants whom
31
the community deems problematic. Some cities, like Milwaukee,
explicitly state that the purpose of crime-free nuisance ordinances
32
is to shift the cost of policing from taxpayers to landlords. Proponents of the ordinances also claim that the policies are “designed

20. Sandra S. Park, Stopping Evictions Caused by Nuisance Ordinances, in NAT’L L. CTR. ON
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, PROTECT TENANTS, PREVENT HOMELESSNESS 28 (2018),
https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ProtectTenants2018.pdf.
21. Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 877–78.
22. Sandra Park & Michaela Wallin, Local Nuisance Ordinances: Penalizing the Victim, Undermining Communities?, MUN. LAW. MAG., May/June 2015, at 6, https://imla.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/article-1755.pdf.
23. Id.
24. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.454 (2019).
25. Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 847 (2015).
26. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(A)(4) (2019).
27. Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 879.
28. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(A)(4) (2019).
29. Park & Wallin, supra note 22, at 7.
30. Anna Kastner, The Other War at Home: Chronic Nuisance Laws and the Revictimization of
Survivors of Domestic Violence, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1047, 1063 (2015).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1064 (explaining that shifting policing to landlords saves the city money by
reducing resources spent in responding to emergency calls).
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to reduce crime, drugs, and gangs on apartment properties” and
that municipalities enacting these ordinances benefit from “reduced police calls for service, a more stable resident base, and re34
duced exposure to civil liability.”
Using nuisance ordinances to privatize police responsibilities is
not a new phenomenon. Nuisance ordinances have regulated tenant behavior since the 1980s, when panic over crime rates and
35
drug usage began to spread across communities. It was then that
municipalities began requiring landlords to evict their residents for
criminal and noncriminal offenses. 36 Like the 1986 “War on Drugs”
legislation, nuisance ordinances are “race neutral” in theory but
37
not in enforcement. The discretionary nature of crime-free nuisance ordinances permits racially-targeted enforcement, leading to
38
disparate racial impact.
Though crime-free nuisance ordinances seem confined to individual municipalities, their pervasive nature has created a national
39
problem. Crime-free nuisance ordinances have spread to forty40
41
eight states and around 2,000 municipalities —over ten percent
42
of all municipalities in the United States. They are not limited to
large cities, either; small towns and mid-sized cities across the
43
country have enacted crime-free nuisance ordinances.

33. Crime Free Multi-Housing: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, INT’L CRIME FREE
ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association.org/multi-housing.htm [https://perma.cc/E44X3DLK].
34. Id.
35. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1060.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1061.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1056.
40. INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, supra note 33.
41. Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 878. In 2013, the Shriver Center on Poverty Law
released a report finding that more than one hundred municipalities in Illinois have enacted crime-free nuisance ordinances. EMILY WERTH, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY
L., THE COST OF BEING “CRIME FREE”: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE
RENTAL HOUSING AND NUISANCE PROPERTY ORDINANCES 1 (2013), http://www.poverty
law.org/files/docs/cost-of-being-crime-free.pdf [https://perma.cc/N95L-G62S]. When the
New York Civil Liberties Union surveyed forty of the state’s most populous municipalities
outside of New York City, it found that twenty-five of those cities had crime-free nuisance
ordinances. SCOUT KATOVICH, N.Y. C.L. UNION, MORE THAN A NUISANCE: THE OUTSIZED
CONSEQUENCE OF NEW YORK’S NUISANCE ORDINANCES 10 (2018), https://www.
nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/nyclu_nuisancereport_20180809.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9Z6-PS5T].
42. See Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution, NAT’L LEAGUE OF
CITIES,
https://web.archive.org/web/20201013211310/https://www.nlc.org/number-ofmunicipal-governments-population-distribution (stating that there are 19,492 municipalities
in the United States).
43. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1056.

SPRING 2021]

Conflict Preemption

807

B. Harmful Impact of Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances on
Domestic Violence Survivors
Crime-free nuisance ordinances have received national attention
44
for their devastating impact on victims of domestic violence.
When the Maplewood City Council enforced its crime-free nuisance ordinance against Ms. Watson, she was forced out of her
45
46
home and barred from entering Maplewood for six months.
With nowhere to go, Ms. Watson had to place her items in stor47
age. But this was only a small part of the harm the ordinance
caused her. Ms. Watson’s eviction and prohibition from entering
48
Maplewood prevented her from visiting her doctor, caused her to
49
lose her Section 8 Voucher, and left her homeless and seeking
50
shelter in a vacant building. Eventually, Ms. Watson moved back
to the City of St. Louis, where she continued to face domestic
abuse—the same ex-boyfriend found her at a bus stop and stabbed
51
her. After facing this seemingly endless chain of traumatic events,
Ms. Watson filed a federal lawsuit against Maplewood to challenge
52
the ordinance.
Crime-free nuisance ordinances have re-victimized many women
like Ms. Watson. In 2012 in Norristown, Pennsylvania, Lakisha
Briggs refused to call the police after her former boyfriend stabbed
her in the neck because she knew another 9-1-1 call would leave
53
her and her three-year-old daughter homeless. After a neighbor
saw her injury and called for an ambulance, Ms. Briggs was airlifted
54
to a trauma unit. Three days later, Norristown city officials re-

44. See ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, SILENCED: HOW NUISANCE ORDINANCES
PUNISH CRIME VICTIMS IN NEW YORK 4 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files
/field_document/equ15-report-nuisanceord-rel3.pdf.
45. ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO, supra note 8, at 13:43–13:48.
46. Id. at 14:03–14:17.
47. Id. at 13:43–13:48.
48. Id. at 14:03–14:17.
49. Id. at 14:22–14:36.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 14:40–14:58.
52. First Amended Watson Complaint, supra note 3. The § 1983 claim alleged that
Maplewood violated Ms. Watson’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Missouri
state constitution’s equivalent protections. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. The parties in Watson settled on
September 11, 2018. Rosetta Watson v. City of Maplewood, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org
/cases/rosetta-watson-v-maplewood [https://perma.cc/A6TK-WTQX] (last updated Apr.
10, 2017). Maplewood agreed to pay Ms. Watson $137,000 as compensation for the damages
caused to her. Release and Settlement Agreement at 1, Watson v. City of Maplewood, No.
4:17-cv-1268 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/watson-vmaplewood-settlement. The city also agreed to amend the nuisance ordinance. Id. at 2. Significantly, Maplewood added an exception for victims and now forbids enforcement against
persons who call the police or call for emergency services. Id. at Exhibit A, ¶ 18.
53. See Kastner, supra note 30, at 1048.
54. Id.
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voked her landlord’s rental license and said he must evict Ms.
55
Briggs within ten days. In 2014, in Surprise, Arizona, Nancy
Markham called the police after her ex-boyfriend choked her,
punched her, and threatened her with weapons. Subsequently, a
city police officer enforced the town nuisance ordinance and told
56
Ms. Markham’s landlord to evict her.
Because victims of domestic violence call emergency services
more frequently than other groups, their calls disproportionately
57
trigger nuisance ordinance enforcement. One study surveyed
every nuisance citation distributed in Milwaukee between 2008 and
58
2009. The study found that 3.8% of all 9-1-1 calls concerned domestic violence, yet domestic violence was the reason for 15.7% of
59
all nuisance designations. These domestic violence incidents re60
sulted in 157 citation letters. Landlords responded in eighty-six of
61
these citations. In over half of their responses, the landlords initiated formal or informal eviction proceedings, and in 83% of cases
the landlord “relied on either eviction or threat of eviction for fu62
ture police calls.”
This sort of response from landlords forces domestic violence
survivors to choose between their housing and their safety, as they
know that calling the police on an abusive partner may lead to
63
eviction and homelessness. Women of color and poor women are
more likely to face this impossible choice and experience the nega64
tive impacts of these crime-free nuisance ordinances.
C. Majority-White Municipalities Use Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances to
Prevent Integration
In addition to the harm crime-free nuisance ordinances cause
domestic violence survivors, the ordinances also harm Black fami55. Id. at 1048–49.
56. Nancy Markham v. City of Surprise, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/nancymarkham-v-city-surprise [https://perma.cc/4X37-USEJ] (last updated Jan. 30, 2015).
57. ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 44, at 4.
58. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of ThirdParty Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117 (2012).
59. Id. at 131.
60. Id. at 132.
61. Id. at 133.
62. Id.
63. Amanda K. Gavin, Chronic Nuisance Ordinances: Turning Victims of Domestic Violence
Into “Nuisances” in the Eyes of Municipalities, 119 PA. ST. L. REV. 257, 267 (2014).
64. See Kastner, supra note 30, at 1053–56. For example, a study in Milwaukee found
that the likelihood a property receives a nuisance citation due to domestic violence increases with the percentage of Black residents in the neighborhood. Desmond & Valdez, supra
note 58, at 137 (detailing that the study controlled for both domestic violence calls made
from properties and neighborhoods’ domestic violence rates).
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lies by preventing integration in predominantly white neighborhoods. As people of color move to smaller cities and suburbs, municipalities have passed crime-free nuisance ordinances to dispro65
portionately police and evict Black families. In Faribault,
Minnesota, the Black population nearly tripled between 2000 and
66
2010 and residents complained about increased criminal activity.
Though police records did not support these claims, in 2014 the
city passed a crime-free ordinance to get rid of “problem tenants”
67
living in downtown Faribault.
Two common features of crime-free nuisance ordinances make
them particularly effective tools to prevent integration. First, they
allow discretionary enforcement by police officers and city officials.
Second, they make tenants vicariously liable for the actions of others.
Police are often given broad discretion to selectively enforce
vague ordinances, resulting in biased implementation that dispro68
portionately impacts communities of color. In Antioch, California, a historically majority-white city with a growing Black population, the city created a police unit to surveil alleged nuisances,
69
particularly on rental properties. Antioch gave officers nearly un70
limited discretion to choose the locations to investigate. Rather
than solely focusing on nuisances, the unit closely watched Black
families, searching their homes without warrants and investigating
71
their private lives. Officers in Antioch disproportionately policed
Black tenants receiving Section 8 Vouchers who lived in majority72
white neighborhoods. Broad discretionary powers and vague

65. Rachel Smith, Policing Black Residents as Nuisances: Why Selective Nuisance Law Enforcement Violates the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 87, 96 (2018). One
Ohio study found that crime-free nuisance ordinances were primarily passed to penalize
people of color whose behavior was perceived as disruptive, rather than out of concern for
crime. Id. at 99 (citing JOSEPH MEAD, MEGAN E. HATCH, J. ROSIE TIGHE, MARISSA PAPPAS,
KRISTI ANDRASIK & ELIZABETH BONHAM, WHO IS A NUISANCE? CRIMINAL ACTIVITY NUISANCE
ORDINANCES IN OHIO 3 (2017), https://www.clevescene.com/media/pdf/cano_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3AL8-NTCG] (“Rarely do resident express concern with serious crime.
Instead, residents and councilmembers complain about annoying or rude behavior and
their wish for a certain community character. Race and class undertones are frequently evident.”)).
66. Deborah Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 199 (2019).
67. Id. Faribault’s crime-free nuisance ordinance specifically targets rental housing, and
nearly all of the Black families in downtown Faribault rent their homes. Notably, the ordinance exempts single-family dwellings occupied by a relative of the owner—an exemption
that is far more likely to shield white people from the consequences of the crime-free ordinance. Id. at 200.
68. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1065–66.
69. Smith, supra note 65, at 100.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 101.
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crime-free nuisance ordinances allow for disproportionate enforcement reflecting the prejudices and implicit biases of individu73
al officials. With the widespread use of discretionary nuisance
laws, it is no surprise that Black residents in racially integrated
74
neighborhoods have the highest rates of nuisance citations.
Crime-free nuisance ordinances also disproportionately harm
Black families because the ordinances often apply vicarious liability. This means tenants may be evicted for actions they were only
tangentially connected to through their social or familial relation75
ships. For example, in Florissant in St. Louis County, the nuisance
ordinance states that a landlord’s residential rental license “may be
suspended or revoked if any member of the household, guest or
another person under the resident’s control” commits a criminal
76
activity or municipal offense. Littering, possession of marijuana,
and violating the city curfew for any person under seventeen are all
77
municipal offenses that could lead to eviction. With the ordinance’s broad-sweeping vicarious liability, entire families could be
78
evicted based on the actions of one member.
This expansive vicarious liability overwhelmingly affects lowincome households where one woman supports the family and her
79
adolescent son engages in an illegal activity. These families may
be forced to exclude their children from the home to minimize
80
the risk of eviction. Black families are especially at risk because
Black adolescent males are over-policed and arrested at much
81
higher rates than their white peers. As a result, Black families are
more likely to be forced to choose between (a) excluding a child

73. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1066–67.
74. Smith, supra note 65, at 99.
75. Swan, supra note 25, at 845–46.
76. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(A)(4) (2019).
77. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE §§ 605.461(A)(4)(h) (2019), 210.530 (2020) (littering), 210.1800 (2020) (possession of marijuana), 210.1980, (2020) (curfew violations).
78. Theresa Langley, Living Without Protection: Nuisance Property Laws Unduly Burden Innocent Tenants and Entrench Divisions Between Impoverished Communities and Law Enforcement, 52
HOUS. L. REV. 1255, 1278 (2015).
79. Id. at 1279.
80. See Swan, supra note 25, at 857–58.
81. See Who Are You Calling a Nuisance?: How Nuisance Ordinances Discriminate Against
Families With Children, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.: AMICUS BLOG (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://harvardcrcl.org/who-are-you-calling-a-nuisance-how-nuisance-ordinancesdiscriminate-against-families-with-children/ [https://perma.cc/YZ4Z-KZS5]; see also Smith,
supra note 65, at 99–100 (noting that in 2005, Bedford, Ohio passed a crime-free nuisance
ordinance shortly after the population shifted from majority-white to majority-Black. The
Mayor stated that the ordinance’s purpose was to “police ‘predominantly African American
kids who bring in [a] mentality from the inner city.’ ” (citing MEAD, ET AL., supra note 65, at
4)).

SPRING 2021]

Conflict Preemption

811

from the home to avoid eviction and (b) keeping the family to82
gether but losing their home.
Preventing integration was likely one of the driving factors be83
hind Maplewood’s nuisance ordinance, where the majority white
84
suburb forced Rosetta Watson, a Black woman, out of her home.
This rationale also likely explains why Florissant, whose white pop85
86
ulation dropped from 70.3% in 2010 to 57.6% in 2017, enacted
87
its broad-sweeping, vicarious-liability nuisance ordinance in 2016.
As more Black families moved into Florissant, the City enacted a
sweeping crime-free nuisance ordinance—exemplifying how many
majority-white municipalities are dealing with the threat of integration.
II. CURRENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES CHALLENGING
NUISANCE LAWS
Part II of this Note analyzes current litigation strategies advocates use to challenge crime-free nuisance ordinances. These litigation strategies are often based in anti-discrimination protections,
like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Fair Housing Act. This Section will discuss the limitations
of these approaches and highlight why advocates should pivot to
extra-discrimination strategies.
A. Constitutional Violations
Advocates often allege that crime-free nuisance ordinances violate the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, advocates typically allege violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and First Amendment.

82. See Swan, supra note 25, at 858.
83. See Complaint ¶¶ 2, 3, 16, Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council v.
City of Maplewood, No. 4:17CV886 RLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202308 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8,
2017) [hereinafter Metro. St. Louis Complaint].
84. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2017 ACS 5-YEAR POPULATION ESTIMATE: MAPLEWOOD,
MISSOURI, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=maplewood%20missouri&tid=ACSDP5
Y2017.DP05 [https://perma.cc/EYA4-7FRP].
85. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 ACS 5-YEAR POPULATION ESTIMATE: FLORISSANT CITY,
MISSOURI, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=florissant%20city,%20missouri&tid=
ACSDP5Y2010.DP05 [https://perma.cc/636V-RGTV].
86. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2017 ACS 5-YEAR POPULATION ESTIMATE: FLORISSANT CITY,
MISSOURI, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=florissant%20city,%20missouri&tid=
ACSDP5Y2017.DP05 [https://perma.cc/MY74-PR7N].
87. See FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.453 n.1 (2019).
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1. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohib88
its the denial of equal protection of the law. Advocates can bring
claims of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment
if a crime-free nuisance ordinance was enacted with the purpose
and intent to discriminate against people of color. The ACLU took
this approach in 2018 when it filed a lawsuit on behalf of six Black
renters and a non-profit organization against Faribault, Minnesota.
The Plaintiffs alleged that Faribault enacted its ordinance to reduce the number of Black and Somali residents living in rental
89
housing within its city. To support their claim of intentional discrimination, the Plaintiffs provided direct evidence of racial ani90
mus underlying the ordinance’s enactment. The Plaintiffs pointed to the legislative record, which documented community
concerns about “cultural clashes taking place,” the proximity of a
“very large diverse population,” and ways to handle the growing
91
Somali population and the alleged increasing crime rates. The
Plaintiffs also noted the ordinance’s severe discriminatory impact
(“approximately 90% of Faribault’s Black households are renter
households, as compared to just 28% of non-Hispanic white
92
households” ), plus instances of explicit and coded animus from
93
city officials and community members. If the Plaintiffs successfully
prove that there was intentional discrimination, the ordinance will
be subject to strict scrutiny analysis and almost certainly struck
94
down.

88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. Complaint ¶¶ 1, 63, 64, 66, Jones v. City of Faribault, No. 18-cv-01643 (D. Minn.
June 13, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/jones-et-al-v-city-faribault-complaint
[https://perma.cc/TWW7-C96V].
90. Id. ¶¶ 142–48.
91. Id. ¶¶ 143–45.
92. Id. ¶ 150.
93. Id. ¶¶ 149–62.
94. See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining that “the purpose of
strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool”). While the ordinance could survive strict scrutiny if it is found to be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest,” the Supreme Court has only found a “compelling interest” in two situations: World
War II and affirmative action. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (World
War II); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2013) (affirmative action).
In February 2021, the judge in Jones v. City of Faribault granted in part and denied in
part cross-motions for summary judgment, finding “that the record supports a reasonable
inference that racial animus was either a motivating factor or the but-for cause in the City’s
decision to implement the Ordinance.” Jones v. City of Faribault, No. 18-1643, 2021 WL
1192466, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2021). The court also found that there “remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City’s policy objectives were legitimate or
merely pretext to discriminate against Black and Hispanic residents.” Id. Additionally, the
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A municipality may also violate the Equal Protection Clause if
the nuisance ordinance treats domestic violence victims—the ma95
jority of whom are women—differently than other crime victims.
If domestic violence survivors are treated differently than other
crime victims, the ordinance’s gender-based discrimination is subject to intermediate scrutiny and will be invalid if it is not substan96
tially related to a significant government interest.
Ms. Watson, also represented by the ACLU, raised two genderdiscrimination claims in Watson v. Maplewood. She argued that (1)
“Maplewood intentionally discriminated against women when it
enacted its nuisance ordinance by singling out . . . domestic violence
97
[calls],” the vast majority of which are placed by women, and (2)
Maplewood discriminated against women seeking police help in
98
enforcing its nuisance ordinance against domestic violence victims.
Ms. Watson alleged that Maplewood’s policy of targeting tenants
seeking emergency assistance for domestic violence and “treating
them differently from other [tenants]” did not “advance an important or legitimate government interest, and is not substantially
99
or rationally related to advanc[ing] such an interest.”
100
Maplewood responded by filing a motion to dismiss. The court
dismissed Ms. Watson’s second “enforcement” genderdiscrimination claim but ruled that her first “enactment” claim
101
survived the motion to dismiss. While this partial victory may
have helped Ms. Watson reach a favorable settlement—including
changes to Maplewood’s ordinance—there are drawbacks to Equal
Protection claims. If Maplewood refused to settle, Ms. Watson’s
Equal Protection claim would have been especially vulnerable to
summary judgment. This is because the ordinance did not explicitly reference gender, even though it singled out domestic violence
police calls—making it facially neutral. And facially neutral laws
that have a disparate impact but were not adopted to advance a

judge found that a factual dispute remained “as to whether Plaintiffs have shown a discriminatory effect caused by the Ordinance.” Id.
95. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1072.
96. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570–71 (1996).
97. First Amended Watson Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 99 (emphasis added).
98. Id. ¶¶ 76–79.
99. Id. ¶ 102.
100. Reply Memorandum for Defendant in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, Watson v.
City of Maplewood, No. 4:17-cv-1268-JCH, 2018 WL 1638792 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2018).
101. Watson v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:17CV1268, 2017 WL 4758960, at *6 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 20, 2017). Ms. Watson’s second “enforcement” Equal Protection claim was dismissed
because she offered “no evidence (or even allegation) that Maplewood enforces it Nuisance
Policy differently for men than women.” Id.
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discriminatory purpose do not violate the Fourteenth Amend102
ment.
The court itself alluded to this vulnerability in its ruling on
Maplewood’s motion to dismiss. While Ms. Watson’s allegations
(partially) survived the motion, the court warned that the “eventu103
al burden is high.” After discovery, Ms. Watson would have needed to “present evidence to support her claim that discrimination
against women was a motivating factor in Maplewood’s decision to
104
enact the [crime-free nuisance ordinance].” Proving discriminatory purpose is not a simple task, and “requires a showing that the
law or practice in question was implemented at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifi105
able group.” Since discriminatory intent is exceedingly difficult
to prove, Ms. Watson may have been forced to make a non-gender
discrimination “rational basis” argument instead, arguing that the
ordinance was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. But Ms. Watson would likely lose this claim because the
court would presumably find that the Maplewood ordinance was
enacted for the legitimate interest of protecting the safety of the
106
community.
2. First Amendment Rights
Compared with a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
claim, a First Amendment claim may fare better for plaintiffs alleging constitutional violations. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech and the right “to petition the government.” 107 This
safeguards the right to communicate with law enforcement, includ108
ing reporting a crime or seeking emergency assistance. Government retaliation in response to an individual exercising her First

102. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). However, as Ms. Watson argued
in response to a second motion to dismiss, courts have authorized claims of gender discrimination and domestic violence in the past, “even when the challenged policy or custom did
not specifically refer to gender.” Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, Watson v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:17-cv-1268-JCH, 2018 WL 1638796 (E.D. Mo.
Jan. 10, 2018).
103. Watson, 2017 WL 4758960, at *6.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff, 779 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2015)).
106. See Crum v. Vincent, 493 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that, for Equal
Protection claims analyzed under rational basis review, courts will presume the legislation is
valid and will sustain it if the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest,
meaning “any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it”) (citation omitted).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
108. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1071.
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Amendment rights forms a basis for § 1983 liability. To establish
this claim, a plaintiff must show (1) “she was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity,” (2) “that [the government official’s]
adverse action caused her to suffer an injury which would ‘chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing . . . in that activity,’ ”
and (3) “that the adverse action was motivated in part by . . . [the]
110
exercise of her constitutional rights.”
Ms. Watson alleged a First Amendment violation in Watson v.
Maplewood. When Maplewood enforced its nuisance ordinance, it
revoked Ms. Watson’s occupancy permit because she made police
111
Ms. Watson argued that
calls reporting domestic violence.
Maplewood retaliated against her for exercising her freedom of
112
speech and right to petition the government. Ms. Watson also
brought a facial challenge against the ordinance, arguing that it
violated the First Amendment on its face by imposing penalties for
calling the police, “thereby outright burdening tenants’ ability to
113
report crime and seek police assistance.”
First Amendment claims do not have the same barriers as Equal
Protection claims because there is no discriminatory intent re114
quirement. Additionally, any individual whose right to seek
emergency services has been burdened can bring a First Amendment challenge, regardless of whether or not they belong to a suspect class. However, First Amendment arguments are strongest
when they are used to attack crime-free nuisance ordinances that
explicitly sanction police calls. Many crime-free nuisance ordinances do not mention calls to police at all, but instead impose vicarious liability on residents tangentially connected to “criminal”
115
activity under the ordinance.
Furthermore, the Crime Free Association, an organization dedicated to expanding the use of crime-free programs in rental housing, has conveniently posted on its website a list of issues that the
ACLU looks for when evaluating the legality of a crime-free nuisance ordinance. The Association puts its viewers on notice that
the ACLU challenges nuisance ordinances that penalize tenants
who call the police and tenants who are victims of domestic vio109. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002).
110. Id. at 927–28 (quoting Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2001)).
111. First Amended Watson Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 59–75.
112. Id. ¶ 93.
113. Id. ¶ 92.
114. Equal Protection claims require a showing of discriminatory intent, but First
Amendment retaliation claims only require a showing of retaliatory intent. See Watson v. City
of Maplewood, No. 4:17CV1268, 2017 WL 4758960, at *5–6 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2017). Furthermore, a First Amendment facial challenge does not seem to require any showing of a
government intent. See id.
115. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
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116

lence. In July 2019, the Florissant City Council amended its
crime-free nuisance ordinance to add, “[i]t is not the intent of this
Article and it shall not be construed or enforced in any manner
which would affect the tenancy of a tenant whose only involvement
117
in an incident has been as the victim of a crime.”
In some ways, the Crime Free Association’s warning and Florissant’s carve-out could be viewed as the successful outcome of years
of legal efforts to combat harmful nuisance ordinances. It demonstrates that proponents of crime-free nuisance ordinances are paying attention to complaints and making changes to protect domestic violence survivors. While this may mitigate the ordinances’
detrimental impact on domestic violence survivors described
above, it still leaves municipalities free to use nuisance ordinances
to police Black families and prevent integration.
B. Fair Housing Act Challenges
In addition to constitutional challenges, advocates have challenged crime-free nuisance ordinances under the Fair Housing Act
(FHA). There are three potential avenues for challenging ordinances under the FHA: intentional discrimination, disparate impact, and segregative effects.
1. Intentional Discrimination
The FHA makes it illegal to deny housing or make housing unavailable “to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
118
status, or national origin” or to discriminate “in the terms, condi119
tions, or privileges” for the rental of a dwelling. When municipalities enforce their nuisance laws by selectively forcing landlords to
evict minority groups, they make housing unavailable to these
120
groups. Similar to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
argument, because domestic violence survivors are disproportionately women, nuisance ordinances can be challenged as discrimi121
natorily applied on the basis of sex. The FHA also makes it un-

116. Crime Free Certified Trainer, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-freeassociation.org/trainer_certification.htm [https://perma.cc/6836-F8GC].
117. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.453(C) (2019).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2007).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2007).
120. Smith, supra note 65, at 110.
121. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1069.
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lawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing or to make
122
housing unavailable to those with disabilities.
An FHA claim based on intentional discrimination is called a
disparate-treatment claim. Like Fourteenth Amendment discrimination claims, proving disparate treatment under the FHA requires
establishing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory intent
123
or motive. To show discriminatory intent or motive, a plaintiff
can either rely on direct evidence (e.g., defendant explicitly saying
that she treated plaintiff differently because of plaintiff’s race) or
circumstantial evidence (e.g., plaintiff showing that she was treated
124
differently than a similarly-situated person of a different race).
When relying on circumstantial evidence, differential treatment
supports the inference that the plaintiff was treated differently be125
cause of their race. However, gathering direct or circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory intent may be difficult and is a major
obstacle to winning disparate-treatment claims.
Around the same time the ACLU and Ms. Watson sued Maplewood, the Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity
Council (EHOC) also sued Maplewood, alleging its crime-free nui126
sance ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act. EHOC brought a
disparate-treatment claim, alleging that Maplewood intentionally
enforced its nuisance ordinance disproportionately based on race,
127
sex, and disability. EHOC also alleged that Maplewood did not
enforce its ordinance even-handedly against all eligible residents
but instead “enforce[d] the ordinance selectively against those res128
idents whom it deems undesirable for other reasons.”
The district court held that EHOC failed to state a disparatetreatment claim under the FHA because EHOC did not identify
specific instances where the city enforced the ordinance with dis129
criminatory intent. The court said that EHOC’s complaint only
pled conclusory allegations that do not give an inference of discriminatory intent, and that the complaint failed to set forth examples, for instance, of white residents receiving more favorable
130
treatment. In order to succeed on a claim of racially discrimina-

122. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
123. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519,
524 (2015).
124. CHARLES SULLIVAN & MICHAEL ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 40 (9th ed. 2017).
125. Id.
126. Metro. St. Louis Complaint, supra note 83, ¶¶ 71–78.
127. Id. ¶ 74.
128. Id. ¶ 40.
129. Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council v. City of Maplewood, No.
4:17CV886 RLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202308, at *10–11 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017).
130. Id. at *8–9.
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tory enforcement, EHOC needed not only records showing high
enforcement rates against communities of color, but also records
showing Maplewood did not enforce the ordinance against white
131
communities for similar behavior.
2. Disparate Impact
The FHA also allows for “two distinct types of claims that challenge practices that have a disproportionately adverse effect on
132
minorities: disparate impact and segregative effects.” In Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact claims are cog133
nizable under the Fair Housing Act. Under the disparate impact
theory of liability, a plaintiff “challenges practices that have a ‘disproportionately adverse effect on minorities’ and are otherwise un134
justified by a legitimate rationale.” A prima facie disparate impact
case is established by evidence of a statistical disparity between
groups and by showing a “robust causality requirement” linking the
135
challenged facially neutral policy to the disparity. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants
136
to show that the policy is necessary to achieve a valid interest.
Even if the defendant’s showing is successful, plaintiffs can still win
by proving an available alternative exists that serves the defendant’s
137
legitimate interest.
The “robust causality requirement” is an obstacle to fighting
nuisance ordinances under disparate impact claims. Since Inclusive
Communities, courts have interpreted the robust causality requirement as a stringent framework needed to prevent defendants from
138
being “held liable for racial disparities they did not create.” For
example, the Eighth Circuit held that “robust causality” means that
plaintiffs must point to an “‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary’
139
policy causing the problematic disparity.” In the Seventh Circuit,
a plaintiff claimed that a city’s adoption of a rental unit inspection

131. See Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 901.
132. Archer, supra note 66, at 217.
133. 576 U.S. 519, 545–46 (2015).
134. Id. at 524 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).
135. Id. at 542.
136. Id. at 527.
137. Id. at 533.
138. Id. at 542 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653, superseded by
statute on other grounds, 42 USC §2000–2k); see, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln
Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th Cir. 2019); Oviedo Town Ctr. v. City of Oviedo, 759 Fed.
Appx. 828, 828 (11th Cir. 2018).
139. Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1114 (8th Cir. 2017).
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ordinance violated the FHA because it disproportionately bur140
dened landlords with mostly Black and Latino tenants. The district court, however, ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet the robust causality requirement because the plaintiff did not “lay out a
chain of inferences explaining how the Ordinance will cause a racially disparate impact, as distinct from just resulting in a disparate
141
impact.”
Fair housing advocates may struggle to show the robust causality
requirement when litigating against crime-free nuisance ordinances. Often, the reason that crime-free nuisance ordinances have a
disproportionate impact on minority groups is because the ordinances’ vague language allows for discriminatory enforcement by
142
biased city officials. If courts hold that discriminatory enforcement is not itself caused by the nuisance ordinance, plaintiffs will
struggle to make a prima facie showing of disparate impact.
In its lawsuit against Maplewood, EHOC alleged that the city’s
ordinance had a disparate impact on “non-white residents, women,
143
and people with disabilities.” EHOC gathered data on forty-three
nuisance violation hearings in Maplewood over a five-year peri144
od. For hearings where the household’s race could be ascertained, more than fifty-five percent of the tenants were Black, despite Black people making up only seventeen percent of
145
Maplewood’s population. The court did not find EHOC’s statistical evidence sufficient to establish robust causation. The court stated that, “at best,” EHOC’s evidence showed “an imbalance result146
ing from enforcement of the ordinance.” Consequently, EHOC’s
disparate impact claim was rejected for failing to state a claim under the FHA because it did not plausibly allege that the nuisance
ordinance caused a disparity. 147

140. TBS Grp., LLC v. City of Zion, No. 16CV5855, 207 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183060, *3
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017).
141. Id. at *24–25.
142. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
143. Metro. St. Louis Complaint, supra note 83, ¶ 74.
144. Id. ¶ 25.
145. Id. ¶ 26. EHOC also found that sixteen of the forty-three enforcement actions were
due to incidents of domestic disturbance, six of which involved a woman being attacked by a
man. Id. ¶ 29. It found that eleven of the enforcement actions involved tenants seeking
emergency services because of mental illness or other disabilities. See id. ¶ 35–37.
146. Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council v. City of Maplewood, No.
4:17CV886 RLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202308, at *14 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017) (emphasis
added).
147. Id. at *13–15.
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3. Segregative Effects
In addition to prohibiting policies that have a disparate impact
on protected groups, the FHA also restricts actions that have segregative effects—policies and practices that create, increase, rein148
force, or perpetuate segregated housing patterns. The same burden shifting framework used with disparate impact claims applies
to segregative effects claims. To establish a prima facie segregative
effects claim, a plaintiff must “(1) challenge a distinct practice or
policy of the defendant; (2) use statistical evidence to show that
the identified practice creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates
segregated housing patterns in the relevant community; and (3)
establish that the challenged practice is the cause of the segrega149
tive effect.”
The segregative effects theory is primarily employed against
municipalities using their zoning powers to prevent integrated
150
housing developments in predominantly white communities.
The segregative effects provision has not yet been tested against
crime-free nuisance ordinances, but it has the potential to be more
151
successful than disparate impact claims. Unlike disparate impact
claims, which focus on a particular policy, segregative effects claims
can challenge both individual housing decisions and broad poli152
cies. The Maplewood district court dismissed EHOC’s disparate
impact claim because the disproportionate outcome was a result of
the discretionary enforcement of the nuisance ordinance, rather than
153
the policy itself. Alleging segregative effects instead of disparate
impact would allow the plaintiff to target the discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance by arguing that, cumulatively, this
154
practice perpetuates segregation.
The segregative effects theory may be promising, but it is not a
silver bullet. While courts have accepted relatively simple census
155
data to prove a segregative effects claim, showing severe segrega156
tion seems to be a prerequisite for a successful claim. In Avenue

148. Archer, supra note 66, at 217 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2018)).
149. Id. at 218–19.
150. Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 709, 713 (2017).
151. See Archer, supra note 66, at 219.
152. Id. at 219–20.
153. Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council v. City of Maplewood, No.
4:17CV886 RLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202308, at *13–14 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017).
154. See Archer, supra note 66, at 220.
155. Schwemm, supra note 150, at 738–39; see, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977).
156. Schwemm, supra note 150, at 764; see, e.g., Arlington Heights, 558. F.2d at 1291 n.9
(finding that a city that is 99% white is evidence of “overwhelming” racial segregation).
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6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment ruling against the plaintiffs’ segregative effects
157
claim. The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the
city’s refusal to rezone land for a predominantly Hispanic development had segregative effects because “Hispanics [were] not a
minority in Yuma; they actually constitute[d] 55% of the popula158
tion.” Under this reasoning, a segregative effects claim against
Florissant’s crime-free nuisance ordinance would likely fail because
the city’s census data reflects increased integration over the last ten
159
years. This suggests that a segregative effects claim may not be
the best strategy to preemptively tackle a crime-free nuisance ordinance implemented in a fairly integrated city.
In addition to the legal standards discussed above, advocates
must consider the psychological obstacles to bringing claims under
anti-discrimination laws. Psychology studies show that even when
there is significant evidence of invidious discriminatory intent,
most people—including judges and jurors—refuse to attribute the
160
behavior to discrimination. Professor Katie Eyer theorizes that
separating the legal inquiry from direct allegations of discrimination will help plaintiffs avoid psychological obstacles preventing
161
successful anti-discrimination claims. Rather than attempting to
expand existing anti-discrimination doctrine, advocates should
look to extra-discrimination remedies to alleviate the disparate impact of crime-free nuisance ordinances. Part II discussed First
Amendment challenges, which is one extra-discrimination remedy
used to combat crime-free nuisance ordinances. Part III explores
another extra-discrimination litigation strategy: conflict preemption by state laws that protect tenants’ rights to their rental housing.
III. CONFLICT PREEMPTION AND CRIME-FREE
NUISANCE ORDINANCES
Crime-free nuisance ordinances are pervasive and deeply problematic. These policies are detrimental to vulnerable communities,
157. 818 F.3d 493, 513 (9th Cir. 2016).
158. Schwemm, supra note 150, at 733 (quoting Ave. 6E Invs. v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09cv-00297 JWS, 2013 WL 2455928, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2013)).
159. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
160. Eyer, supra note 1, at 1278–79.
161. Id. at 1280–81, 1346 (“Because the operative issue under [extra-discrimination
remedies] is not whether a particular individual has been discriminated against—but rather
whether the . . . facts presented can fulfill . . . statutory or judicial requirements—the difficult and psychologically contingent question of whether discrimination truly took place
need not be resolved.”).
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but they are often disguised by a legitimate local need to protect
the general welfare of the city and promote safety in rental hous162
ing. Without pressure from communities or litigation brought by
advocacy groups, it seems that there is not much standing in the
way of municipalities creating these laws. As discussed in Part II,
there are multiple constitutional and statutory claims advocates use
to challenge these ordinances, but there are limitations to each.
Part III discusses an overlooked protection that can be used to
challenge crime-free nuisance ordinances: state landlord-tenant
laws. This Part explores whether excessively broad crime-free nuisance ordinances are preempted by state eviction laws and recommends that tenants’ advocates align with landlord associations to
fight these ordinances.
A. Conflict Preemption Doctrine: The Limits of Municipal Police Power
Municipalities derive their law-making powers from the state legislature or state constitution. There are two leading doctrines that
define the scope of municipal legislative powers: Dillon’s Rule and
home-rule. Under Dillon’s Rule, the powers of a municipality only
include powers enumerated by the state’s constitution, statutes, or
163
charter. The majority of states, however, have home-rule provi164
sions. Home-rule provisions are state constitutional or statutory
provisions that give localities the power to adopt their own municipal charters and regulations, subject to the laws and policy of the
165
state. In contrast to Dillon’s Rule, cities governed by home-rule
do not depend on the state legislature for authority and instead
166
have power directly from the state constitution.
As part of their home-rule authority, municipalities are often
empowered to declare and abate public nuisances by enacting or167
dinances. This power exists under the municipality’s general po-

162. See Simeone-Casas, supra note 15.
163. 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:10 (3d ed.,
rev. vol. 2019). The powers enumerated include (1) powers expressly conferred, (2) powers
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and (3) powers
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality. See also 56 AM. JUR. 2D,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, ETC. § 163 (2020).
164. Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1129
(2012).
165. 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1:43 (3d ed.,
2019).
166. 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:18 (3d ed.,
2019).
167. 6A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24:67 (3d ed.,
2019).
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168

lice power. Municipal police power allows for local regulation
and legislation to preserve public peace, health, morality, and wel169
fare. Although these are issues of general state concern, they are
often local in nature and appropriately dealt with through local
laws. However, local control over nuisance abatement is not limitless—municipalities’ legislating powers are limited by state and
170
federal laws.
Preemption doctrine establishes a priority between potentially
171
conflicting laws enacted by various levels of government. Munici172
pal ordinances are subordinate to state laws. This means that
municipal ordinances must be in harmony with state law, and if
there is any conflict between a municipal ordinance and state stat173
ute, the statute preempts the ordinance. While preemption doctrine varies by state, generally preemption of a municipal ordi174
nance by a state law can be express or implied. This Note focuses
on one type of implied preemption—conflict preemption—which
exists if the municipal ordinance irreconcilably conflicts with or
stands as an obstacle to the execution of the full purpose of a state
175
statute.
Under conflict preemption doctrine, a municipal ordinance enacted pursuant to local police power is invalid if it conflicts with a
176
general law of the state. For instance, a municipal ordinance is
preempted by state law when a right or benefit expressly given by
177
the state law has been curtailed or taken away by the ordinance.
Courts examining potential conflict preemption look to the language of the local ordinance and state statute, and ask whether the
direct consequences of the local ordinance render illegal what is

168. Id.
169. Id. § 24:1.
170. Id. § 24:72.
171. 5 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 15:18 (3d ed.
2019).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 15:19.
174. Id. Express preemption occurs where the state statute explicitly bars local government from acting on a particular issue. Id. Implied preemption can occur through field
preemption or conflict preemption. Field preemption is found where an entire statute is so
comprehensive that the general assembly intended to occupy the entire field completely so
that no local ordinances on the issue are permitted. Id.
175. Id.
176. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 163, § 109. In this context, “general law” is defined as
“part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment,” must “apply to all parts of the
state and operate uniformly throughout the state,” must “set forth police, sanitary, or similar
regulations,” rather than only granting or limiting the “legislative power of a municipal corporation to establish those types of regulations,” and must “prescribe a rule of conduct on
citizens generally.” Id. at n.4.
177. MCQUILLIN, supra note 171, § 15:19.
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178

specifically allowed by state law. This Note discusses whether
crime-free nuisance ordinances irreconcilably conflict with and
stand as an obstacle to the rights created by state landlord-tenant
laws.
B. Conflict Preemption Applied to Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances
Advocates who use conflict preemption to fight crime-free nuisance ordinances should first review state landlord-tenant statutes
to discern tenants’ rental protections under state law. Second, advocates must look to the state’s constitution and case law to determine whether conflict preemption claims are available in that
state, and if so, the applicable conflict preemption test. Finally, advocates must compare state law eviction grounds with crime-free
nuisance ordinance eviction grounds to determine potential conflict. This Section performs this analysis using crime-free nuisance
ordinances in Iowa and Missouri as an example.
1. State Landlord-Tenant Laws Create Rights for both
Landlords and Tenants
The purpose of landlord-tenant laws is to delineate the rights
that accompany rental agreements. These laws protect both landlords and tenants, and every state has a landlord-tenant statute that
179
includes the legitimate reasons for evicting tenants. For example,
all landlord-tenant laws provide a remedy for landlords when their
180
tenants fail to pay rent.
States diverge, however, regarding procedural protections given
to tenants during the eviction process, as well as which tenant behaviors can lead to eviction. In Iowa, for example, state law offers a
“notice to cure” provision when a tenant’s actions put them at risk
181
of eviction. Landlords must give tenants the opportunity to

178. Id.
179. See Richard A. Leiter & William S. Hein & Co., Leases and Rental Agreements, in 50
STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS (2016); Thompson Reuters, Unlawful Detainer, in 50 STATE
STATUTORY SURVEYS (2020).
180. See Thompson Reuters, Unlawful Detainer, in 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS (2019).
181. AMBER DESMET, IOWA LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 24 (2012) (citing
IOWA CODE §§ 562A.27A, 562B.25(1)) (“The landlord is required to deliver a written notice
to cure the breach to the tenant which also specifies when the rental agreement will terminate if the breach is not remedied.”); see also IOWA CODE § 562A.27A (2014) (providing that
a tenant must be given an opportunity to remedy a violation if criminal activity was committed by a co-tenant or guest).
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“cure” the issue before they can pursue an eviction. This state law
“notice to cure” provision may be curtailed by municipal crime-free
183
nuisance ordinances. In Missouri, state law provides four ways
that a landlord can terminate a tenancy outside those established
184
in a lease. If a St. Louis County ordinance demands the eviction
of a tenant for reasons not authorized in the Missouri statute, the
ordinance may infringe on tenants’ rights and conflict with state
law.
2. Conflict Preemption Standard
As explained above, conflict preemption occurs when a local law
is irreconcilable with a state statute. The precise legal standard for
conflict preemption varies state-to-state, but it is generally quite
demanding. In both Iowa and Missouri, for example, a municipal
ordinance is unavoidably irreconcilable with the statute—and
preempted by it—when the ordinance prohibits what the statute
permits, or permits what the statute prohibits. 185 However, Iowa
courts are required to interpret state law in a manner that renders
186
it harmonious with the ordinance, if at all possible. Furthermore,
187
Iowa courts must presume the ordinance is valid, and the conflict

182. Some states do not provide an opportunity for tenants to cure the issue before a
landlord can pursue an eviction. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-1 (providing no opportunity
for a tenant to remedy a breach prior to a landlord initiating eviction proceedings).
183. See, e.g., Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. EQCV069920, at 16
(Dist. Ct. Linn Cnty. July 1, 2011), http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content
/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-11.pdf?
[https://perma.cc/K368CWVS] (holding that conflict preemption applies where a crime-free nuisance ordinance
lacks a notice to cure provision, thus rendering the ordinance irreconcilable with state law).
The court in Landlords of Linn County also held that the ordinance’s extended grounds for
eviction were irreconcilable with state law. Id. This particular application of conflict preemption doctrine is discussed in more detail below. See infra Section III.B.3.
184. First, landlords can terminate a month-to-month lease by giving the tenant one
month’s notice, requiring the person in possession to vacate the premises. MO. REV. STAT. §
441.060. Second, landlords can terminate a year-to-year lease by giving notice of intention to
terminate at least sixty days before the end of the year. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.050. Third, a
landlord can evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent. MO. REV. STAT. § 535.020. Fourth, a
landlord can terminate the lease if the tenant uses the property for certain illegal purposes.
See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 441.020, 441.740. The fourth avenue will be discussed in more detail
below.
185. See City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1990) (quoting City of
Council Bluffs v. Cain, 342 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1983)); Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of
St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Mo. 2017) (quoting Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape
Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)).
186. City of Des Moines, 457 N.W.2d at 342.
187. Iowa Grocery Indus. Ass’n v. City of Des Moines, 712 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa 2006).
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must be “obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of reasonable de188
bate.”
The Missouri conflict preemption test is similarly stringent. Or189
dinances are presumed to be valid and lawful. Furthermore,
there is no conflict preemption when a municipal ordinance simply supplements a state statute, such as when the municipality pro190
hibits more than the state prohibits. Although this Note focuses
on Iowa and Missouri, similar conflict preemption tests also apply
191
192
193
in other states, including Minnesota, Maryland, New York,
194
and Pennsylvania.
3. Challenging Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances with
Conflict Preemption Doctrine
In Iowa, a group of landlords successfully challenged a Cedar
Rapids crime-free nuisance ordinance, arguing that the ordinance
195
conflicted with state law establishing the grounds for eviction.
The Cedar Rapids ordinance required residential rental agree196
ments to include a crime-free lease addendum. The crime-free
lease addendum was overly broad, requiring landlords to pursue
eviction when residents or anyone affiliated with the residents en-

188. Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. EQCV069920, at 1 (Dist. Ct.
Linn Cnty. July 1, 2011), http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads
/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-11.pdf? [https://perma.cc/K368-CWVS].
189. See Coop. Home Care, Inc., 514 S.W.3d at 578.
190. Id. at 583.
191. Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, 891 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Minn. 2017) (quoting Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 143 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1966)) (stating that
conflict preemption “exists between state law and municipal regulation when the law and
the regulation ‘contain express or implied terms that are irreconcilable with each other,’
when ‘the ordinance permits what the statute forbids,’ or when ‘the ordinance forbids what
the statute expressly permits.’ ”).
192. Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty. v. Chaney Enter., 165 A.3d 379, 395 n.19
(Md. 2017) (stating that conflict preemption exists when a local ordinance prohibits what
the state permits or permits what the state prohibits).
193. People v. Torres, 108 N.Y.S. 3d 269, 271 (App. Term 2019), leave to appeal granted, 34
N.Y.3d 1163, 2020 WL 1187072 (2020) (stating that if local laws do not prohibit what the
state law permits nor allow what the state law forbids, the local law is not inconsistent with
state law. There is no conflict preemption when a local law merely provides a greater penalty
than the state law.).
194. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp. v. City of Lancaster, 214 A.3d 639, 648 (Pa. 2019) (quoting
Harris-Walsh Inc. v. Borough of Dickson City, 216 A.2d 329, 333–34 (Pa. 1966)) (stating that
conflict preemption exists, and an ordinance is invalid, if it stands as an obstacle to the execution of the full purpose of a law enacted by the General Assembly). To explore the conflict preemption standards in other states, see MCQUILLIN, supra note 171, § 15:19.
195. Swan, supra note 25, at 883.
196. Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. EQCV069920, at 1 (Dist. Ct.
Linn Cnty. July 1, 2011), http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads
/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-11.pdf? [https://perma.cc/K368-CWVS].
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gaged in certain enumerated crimes, including misdemeanors.
The ordinance allowed the city to punish a landlord who did not
enforce the crime-free addendum by revoking or suspending their
198
rental license. Iowa’s landlord-tenant law, however, permits lease
termination when a tenant creates a clear and present danger to
199
others. The court held that the Cedar Rapids ordinance was
200
preempted by state law. Because the grounds for eviction under
the ordinance were broader than those found in the state statute,
the ordinance interfered with a protection provided by the state,
201
thus rendering the ordinance irreconcilable and unenforceable.
A similar argument could be applied in St. Louis County, where
crime-free nuisance ordinances coerce landlords to evict tenants
based on certain proscribed behaviors. Parts of Missouri’s landlordtenant statute allow or require landlords to evict tenants when they
or someone associated with them engages in illegal acts on the
premises. If a tenant uses the property for certain illegal purposes,
the lease becomes void and the landlord may take possession of
202
the property after providing a ten-day written notice to vacate.
Specific illegal purposes include: using the premises as a brothel;
prohibited gaming; or allowing the illegal possession, sale, or dis203
tribution of controlled substances on the property. Additionally,
the statute allows immediate eviction of a tenant when emergency
situations arise that would cause physical injury or extensive prop204
erty damage, or when drug-related criminal activity occurs. The
197. Id. at 1, 16.
198. Id. at 1.
199. Id. at 12–13.
200. Id. at 16.
201. Id.
202. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.020 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 441.040 (1997) (providing that
landlords may repossess the premises after issuing ten days’ notice to violators of § 441.020).
203. Id.
204. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.740 (1997). The statute provides for expedited eviction when:
(1) An emergency situation where dispossession of the tenant by other, less expeditious means would . . . cause . . . (a) Physical injury to other tenants or the lessor,
or (b) Physical damage to lessor’s property and the reasonable cost to repair such
damage exceeds an amount equal to twelve months of rent; . . . (2) Drug-related
criminal activity has occurred on or within the property leased to the tenant; (3)
The property leased to the tenant was used to further, promote, aid or assist in drug-related
criminal activity; (4) The tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a guest
has engaged in drug-related criminal activity either within, on or in the immediate vicinity
of the leased property.
Id. (emphasis added). The statue also provides for expedited eviction when:
(5) The tenant has given permission to or invited a person to enter onto or remain on any portion of the leased property, and the tenant did so knowing that
the person had been removed or barred from the leased property . . . or (6) The
tenant has failed to promptly notify the plaintiff that a person whom the plaintiff
previously had removed from the property leased by the tenant, with the

828

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:3

statute allows an “interested party” to pursue eviction if the land205
lord or appropriate prosecuting attorney fails to do so. This part
of the statute resembles some crime-free nuisance ordinances because it allows the municipality or neighborhood association to
pursue eviction even if a landlord chooses not to. However, the
206
state law allows this in very limited and extreme circumstances.
If a city in St. Louis County, like Florissant, has a crime-free nuisance ordinance that is not closely tailored to the grounds for eviction provided by the Missouri statute, it may be void due to conflict
preemption. Determining whether conflict preemption applies requires comparing Missouri law and the municipal ordinance(s).
Under Florissant’s crime-free nuisance ordinance, a landlord may
be required to evict a tenant or have its renter’s license suspended
if any member of the household, guest, or another person under
the resident’s control commits (or is believed to have committed)
207
any number of activities. Chapter 210 of the Florissant Municipal
code, referenced in Florissant’s crime-free nuisance ordinance, in208
cludes over one hundred offenses. Any of these offenses, even if
committed just once, can trigger the crime-free nuisance ordinance. This is true regardless of whether the offense occurred on
or near the property. The triggering offenses range from littering

knowledge of the tenant, has returned to, entered onto or remained on the property leased by the tenant.
Id.
205. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.730 (2011) (defining an “interested party” as “any incorporated, not-for-profit neighborhood association or community-based organization which represents the well-being and interests of the community where the leased property is located”).
206. See MO. REV. STAT. § 441.740 (1997) (listing grounds for expedited eviction); MO.
REV. STAT. § 441.730 (2011) (defining non-landlord, non-prosecuting attorney “interested
parties” who may pursue eviction).
207. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(a)–(i) (2019). The activities that would
require eviction include:
a. A felony crime . . . on or in the immediate vicinity of the residence; b. A Class A
misdemeanor . . . in the immediate vicinity of the premises; c. Any criminal activity that threatens the health or safety of, or the right to peaceful enjoyment of the
premises by other residents; d. Any criminal activity that threatens the health or
safety of, or the right to peaceful enjoyment of their residents or persons residing
in the immediate vicinity of the premises; e. Any violent criminal activity at or in
the immediate vicinity of the premises; f. Any drug-related criminal activity on or
in the immediate vicinity of the premises; g. Any abuse of drugs or alcohol that
threatens health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of other residents on the
premises or persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises; h. Violation(s) of the offenses set forth in Chapter 210 of the Florissant Municipal Code;
or i. Violation(s) of nuisance provisions set forth in Chapter 213 of the Florissant
Municipal Code.
Id.
208.

See FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE §§ 210.020–210.2290 (2020).
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and use of a hand-held wireless communications device while driv209
ing to kidnapping and assault.
Still, there are parts of the Florissant crime-free nuisance ordi210
nance that are consistent with Missouri law. Paragraph (f), for instance, almost mirrors the proscribed offense in Missouri Revised
Statute § 441.740(2)–(4)—any drug related criminal activity on or
211
in the immediate vicinity of the property. Paragraphs (c)–(e) are
also arguably in harmony with Missouri Revised Statute §
441.740(1) (if the criminal activity complained of would cause physical injury or significant property damage). However, Florissant’s
212
inclusion of (a), (b), (h), and (i) —which includes hundreds of
offenses—vastly extends the list of tenant behavior beyond what is
proscribed by Missouri Revised Statute §§ 441.020 and 441.740. In
doing so, the municipal ordinance permits eviction where the statute prohibits it, thus interfering with a state-granted protection.
Florissant might defend its crime-free nuisance ordinance as
simply supplemental, arguing that requiring an eviction based on a
broader category of disruptive behavior merely prohibits more
than what the state prohibits, and is therefore not preempted.
There are two issues with this argument. First, municipal expansion of liability on a subject regulated by state law creates an irreconcilable conflict that renders the ordinance void and unenforce213
able. Nuisance ordinances expand liability by vastly extending
the potential grounds for eviction. Second, to supplement state law
by prohibiting more than what the state prohibits, the municipal
214
ordinance must serve the same purpose as the state law. Landlord-tenant laws are intended to protect the rights of both landlords and tenants. Crime-free nuisance ordinances contradict this
purpose by evicting tenants for a wide range of activities. Crimefree nuisance ordinances do not simply prohibit more activity than

209. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE §§ 210.580, 210.530, 210.170, 210.110 (2019).
210. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(f) (2019).
211. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(c)–(e) (2019).
212. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(a), (b), (h), (i) (2019).
213. See Edwards v. City of Ellisville, 426 S.W.3d 644, 650, 663 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013)
(holding that the city ordinance’s strict liability for vehicle owners whose car was recorded
running a red-light is in conflict with state law, which only regulates driver and pedestrian
conduct. The municipality’s expansion of liability permits penalization of persons who are
neither drivers nor pedestrians for running a red light, while the state statute prohibits such
penalization.).
214. See Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 583–84 (Mo. 2017)
(holding that a city ordinance setting the minimum wage higher than the state minimum
wage is not preempted because it serves the same purpose of the state law: to ameliorate the
unequal bargaining power between employer and employee and to protect the rights of
workers). Since the state minimum wage was not intended to protect employers, the city’s
ordinance simply supplements the state law by setting additional local limits on the minimum amount an employer can pay an employee. Id.
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state law—they contravene tenants’ rights to their rental housing as
provided by state law.
4. Limitations of Conflict Preemption as a Litigation Strategy
Conflict preemption is a promising tool to combat crime-free
nuisance ordinances. However, given the stringent requirements
for conflict preemption, it would not work as a catchall litigation
strategy against crime-free nuisance ordinances. For instance, a
nuisance ordinance may be so vague that it could easily coerce an
eviction in conflict with state law, yet on its face does not explicitly
215
expand the grounds for eviction. Because the standard for conflict preemption sets a high bar, challenging crime-free nuisance
ordinances under conflict preemption will likely be most successful
when used against municipalities that require crime-free lease addendums —such as Cedar Rapids—or when the ordinance coerces
landlords to evict tenants for minor offenses—like in Florissant.
Furthermore, conflict preemption may not be an option in some
states. The home rule provisions in Illinois’ and Montana’s consti216
tutions effectively rule out implied preemption arguments. In Illinois, the home rule provision states that “[h]ome rule units may
exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or
function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or
217
specifically declare the State’s exercise to be exclusive.” The
Montana Constitution provides that “a local government unit
adopting a self-government charter may exercise any power not
218
prohibited by this constitution, law, or charter.” The Montana
Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that “only express statutory provisions preempt ordinances of a self-governing
219
municipality.”
Even if a state’s constitution allows for conflict preemption, the
state’s courts may be resistant to conflict preemption claims. 220 In
Texas, for example, the constitution’s home rule provision states
that no ordinance “shall contain any provision inconsistent with

215. See UNIVERSITY CITY, MO., MUN. CODE §§ 220.020, 220.040, and 220.060 (2016).
Although the nuisance ordinance is very broad and gives city officials unrestrained discretion, it does not expressly target tenants.
216. 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 4:13 (2020).
217. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
218. MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
219. MARTINEZ, supra note 216, § 4:13 n.6 (citing D & F Sanitation Serv. v. City of
Billings, 713 P.2d 977, 982 (Mont. 1986)).
220. See id. § 4:13.
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the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the
221
Legislature of this State.” But the Texas Supreme Court held that
“[t]he intention of the Legislature to impose limitations” on the
power of home rule cities must “appear with unmistakable clari222
ty.” This means that while Texas allows conflict preemption on
paper, Texas courts do not seem eager to apply the doctrine to
strike down municipal laws in practice. Therefore, claims based on
conflict preemption may be effective in many places but will not be
possible in all states.
C. Implementation Recommendations: Opportunity for a Unique Alliance
This Note has primarily discussed the harms crime-free nuisance
ordinances cause vulnerable populations and the ways tenants and
civil rights and fair housing advocates can sue municipalities. Tenants, however, are not the only people aggrieved by these ordinances; landlords also have a stake in this fight. Some landlords
may support crime-free nuisance ordinances because they provide
an excuse to evict “troublesome” renters. But because nuisance ordinances are typically enforced by sanctioning landlords, the ordi223
nances tend to be unpopular among lessors. Landlords may turn
224
to litigation to solve this problem. While tenants have the most to
lose—literally their homes—municipalities force the hands of landlords by threatening to revoke their renters’ license or fine them if
225
they do not cooperate. Landlords and tenants are unlikely allies,
often with conflicting interests. However, crime-free nuisance ordinances create a unique situation where landlords and tenants
share a common opponent: the municipality. Tenants’ rights advocates should consider collaborating with landlord groups and realty associations to fight these ordinances. Furthermore, rather than
selecting individual plaintiffs who have been directly affected by
the ordinance, tenants’ advocates and landlords’ associations
should rely on organizational standing to bring suits to dismantle
these laws.

221. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
222. Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 532 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1975)
(quoting City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. 1964)).
223. See Kastner, supra note 30, at 1057; Gavin, supra note 63, at 275 (“[T]he ordinances
have proven to be unpopular with both tenants and landlords, resulting in a plague of lawsuits against the municipalities that adopt such ordinances.”).
224. See, e.g., Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. EQCV069920 (Dist.
Ct. Linn Cnty. July 1, 2011), http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads
/downloads/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-11.pdf? [https://perma.cc/K368-CWVS]. See
also supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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By coordinating their efforts, tenants’ advocates and landlords’
associations can access more information and fund their litigation
226
more efficiently. Collaboration may also help to avoid working
towards contradictory objectives, instead pushing both groups to
227
focus on their common goals. If tenants’ advocates take on this
fight alone, landlords’ associations might move to intervene in lawsuits, seeking different outcomes. For example, landlords may want
to fight crime-free nuisance ordinance penalties but may nevertheless voluntarily include crime-free lease addendums. Tenants’ advocates should be wary of potential landlord intervention and proactively seek to form early alliances with landlords against municimunicipalities, rather than end up in a three-way legal battle.
In addition to the pragmatic benefits of coordination, joining efforts may put plaintiffs in a better position to mitigate counterarguments to conflict preemption claims. For example, defendant
municipalities may argue that conflict preemption claims should
not be accepted because they suggest that any non-statutory reason
for eviction or lease termination is impermissible. This implication
seemingly contradicts the state statute’s intent. After all, Missouri
state landlord-tenant laws do not claim that the enumerated
grounds are the only grounds for eviction—such an explicit prohibition would prevent landlords from evicting tenants for lease violations. However, landlords and tenants together can argue that state
law establishes a list of presumptive rights—not an exclusive list of
eviction/lease termination grounds—and that they are free to negotiate a lease modifying their state statutory rights. For example, a
landlord and tenant are free to agree that pets are prohibited on
the premises and that the lease will be terminated if the tenant
does not adhere to this term.
The freedom to contract around presumptive rights poses a
problem, however, when landlords choose to include a crime-free
addendum in their leases. Such an addendum is a place where
landlords and tenants’ interests diverge, and the fragile alliance
may dissolve. Furthermore, a landlord’s power over lease terms
and a tenant’s inability to bargain for more protections in the lease
leaves tenants vulnerable to housing instability. Despite these potential conflicts of interest, collaborating may still be the most effective and efficient way to tackle the problem presented in this
Note: municipalities enforcing facially neutral crime-free nuisance
ordinances in a way that disparately impacts vulnerable populations and inhibits racial integration. Even if landlords and tenants
226. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386–87 (2000).
227. Id.
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cannot overcome their differences to form an alliance, both
groups should explore conflict preemption as an extradiscrimination legal doctrine to challenge burdensome crime-free
nuisance ordinances.
CONCLUSION
Crime-free nuisance ordinances are facially neutral laws that
have been discriminatorily enforced by municipalities. Because
there are many obstacles to using anti-discrimination protections
to challenge these laws, advocates should expand their strategies to
include creative, extra-discrimination solutions to tackle these ordinances. Advocates across the country should examine their
state’s landlord-tenant laws and preemption doctrine to determine
whether conflict preemption is a viable option to combat crimefree nuisance ordinances in their cities.

